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International Environmental Law:
Boundaries, Landmarks, and Realities
Lakshman Guruswamy
The tenth anniversary of Natural Re-sources & Environment is an auspiciousoccasion for reviewing U.S. environmen-tal law. It also offers a felicitous opportu-nity to better understand that influential,sometimes awkward, cousin of U.S. envi-
ronmental law: international environmental law (IEL).
Once overshadowed by its prominent parents, national
environmental laws (including those of the United
States) and international law, this youthful and dynamic
subject has come of age in its own right. IEL now pa-
trols an increasingly interconnected and interdepen-
dent world of expanding legal boundaries and is firmly
ensconced in the law school curriculum, even as prac-
titioners and judges at all levels, come alive to its im-
port and impact.
Historically, the United States believed that its do-
mestic environmental laws could solve the problems
of the environment, largely because assaults on the
natural environment did not have or were not per-
ceived as having much transnational impact or signifi-
cance. The reality and perception have changed. Many
environmental problems such as global warming, the
endangered ozone layer, vanishing biodiversity, and
acid rain have outstripped the jurisdiction, outreach,
and grasp of the U.S. legal system, and require interna-
tional solutions. Beginning with the Stockholm Confer-
ence on the Human Environment, in which the United
States played a prominent role, the world has come
alive to the importance of the new subject of interna-
tional environmental law, boasting a corpus of nearly
300 multilateral treaties covering almost every environ-
mental topic.
This article begins by defining IEL and tries to dis-
pel some misconceptions about its jurisprudential na-
ture. It then attempts to sketch the growth of IEL
through three historic landmarks: the Stockholm Con-
ference on the Human Environment, the World Com-
mission on Environment and Development, and the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment, paying particular attention to the dominant
chains of thinking that link these events. Finally, it con-
siders one important treaty, The Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity, signed by 158 countries, that illuminates
the challenges, responses, and limitations of IEL.
Dr. Guruswamy is director, National Energy Law & Policy
Institute and is professor of law at the University of Tulsa
College of Law.
Defining IEL
Jurisprudentially and conceptually, IEL consists of
international law dealing with the environment as
found, primarily, in international agreements (also
called treaties, conventions or pacts), together with the
national and international mechanisms for implement-
ing them; and secondarily, in international customary
law (the common law of the international community).
In other words IEL is located in international agree-
ments or custom, rather than located in the statute
books and case law created by 187 national legislatures
and courts around the world. A study of the environ-
mental laws of various nations that make up the inter-
national community falls within the jurisprudential
realm of comparative environmental law (CEL). That
subject, as distinct from IEL, subsumes laws governing
environmental questions, including air and water pollu-
tion, land use or conservation that are common to most
countries within the international legal system.
When faced with pollution problems it is, of
course, eminently desirable for one country to under-
stand and study the extent to which it confronts com-
mon problems shared by other countries. Uniformities
of biophysical reactions are part of nature's writ that
runs ubiquitously and universally, and the laws of na-
ture can give rise to identical biophysical reactions. If,
for example, the receiving medium is the same, dis-
charges of wastes or residuals, whether in Los Angeles,
Liverpool, Dusseldorf, or Auckland, lead to pollution.
Common biophysical reactions take place regardless of
where in the world the environment is abused. Where
the necessary conditions exist, sulfur dioxide and nitro-
gen oxide will react and result in acidic deposition in
the Ruhr, Northern England, or Ohio. Polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) act to cause cancers in West Virginia
in the same way as they do in Newcastle upon Tyne,
England, or Colombo, Sri Lanka.
While there is much to be learned from the com-
mon experiences of other countries, the miscellaneous
national laws controlling sulphur dioxide emissions and
acid rain or PCBs do not fall within the jurisprudential
province of IEL. The problems of acid rain or any other
pollutant enters the province of IEL only if it escapes
from national boundaries and becomes a transfrontier
problem by causing extraterritorial damage to another
country.
It is important to appreciate at this point that IEL is
a consensual law created by the freely exercised choice
of nation states that are members of the international
community. There is no law-making, law-altering legis-
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lature, no law-implementing executive, and no system
of courts with compulsory jurisdiction of the kinds
found in national legal systems. Unlike the legal system
of the United States, or almost any other nation in
which laws are made, interpreted, and executed by leg-
islatures, courts, and executives, IEL is a remarkably dif-
ferent "horizontal" or discretionary law. The creation of
IEL is dependent upon the comity of parties, rather
than dependent on "vertical" command and control of
legislatures and courts to which national lawyers are
accustomed.
The IEL invoked to deal with the transboundary ef-
fects of acid rain, for example, may be found in a treaty
negotiated between the concerned parties, or some-
times in existing customary norms applicable to the
issue. International treaties are like international con-
tracts between states. Once party states have assumed
an obligation or agreed to act in a specified manner in
a treaty, they are bound to implement these provisions
within their respective national jurisdictions. If a treaty
dealing with acid rain required fitting scrubbers to re-
move sulfur from coal, the methods used to secure im-
plementation of such an obligation are part of the
architecture of IEL. They could range from national leg-
islation and administrative enforcement to monitoring,
reporting, and economic incentives.
The Stockholm Conference
on the Human Environment
The Stockholm Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment, 1972 (Stockholm Conference), may well
have been the cocoon from which the chrysalis of in-
ternational environmental law emerged as a legal sub-
ject in its own right, and it is helpful to recall what
was achieved at that international conference. Prior
to the Stockholm Conference, international environ-
mental problems had been dealt with in a sporadic
and ad hoc manner, with a few, if varied, treaties dot-
ting the landscape of international law. The develop-
ment of IEL was influenced by the thinking, ideology,
and culture of concern about the environment world-
wide just as environmental law was influenced in the
United States.
The themes articulated in Rachel Carson's Silent
Spring, Barry Commoner's Closing Circle, and the
Boulding's "spaceship earth," resonated internationally
in the thinking of other industrial nations. Many of
these themes, and then some, were melded and ex-
pressed with crusading cogency within an international
context in Limits to Growth, a computer-modeled
study sponsored by the Club of Rome, a private group
of industrialists and world leaders. The authors, Mead-
ows and Meadows, painted an apocalyptic picture of
the exponential growth of population, pollution and
exhaustion of natural resources leading to a breakdown
of the carrying capacity of the earth. This book along
with many other phenomena such as acid rain, and the
poisoning of Japanese fisherman in Minimata bay, led
to a realization of the frailty of the planet Earth and cre-
ated a ferment of apprehension among a cross-section
of common people, influential elites, and decisionmak-
ers in the developed industrial world.
In the face of these concerns, the United Nations
(U.N.) was moved to convene a special international
environmental conference in 1972 to discuss the
human environment. Sweden, which had begun to ex-
perience transboundary acid rain, volunteered to host
it in Stockholm. The overall sense of crisis crying out
for global action was brilliantly captured in the book by
Dubos and Ward, Only One Earth: The Care and
Maintenance of a Small Planet, specially commis-
sioned for the Stockholm Conference.Wile concern about the environment mo-
tivated many rich, developed industrial
countries (DCs), the poor less-developed
countries (LDCs) did not share the view
that environmental degradation was the biggest threat
facing the planet. For the LDCs, poverty and the allevia-
tion of misery remained a more poignant and real prob-
lem. And in the preparatory meetings leading to
Stockholm, the LDCs, who called themselves the
Group of 77 after their original number, used particu-
larly sharp rhetoric to express the view that for them
the greatest pollution was caused by poverty. LDCs be-
lieved that greater development, with its concomitant
of resource use and pollution, was more important
than environmental pollution. They were particularly
scornful of the argument that DCs were solicitously try-
ing to steer them away from the same pitfalls in which
DCs had fallen. LDCs expressed resentment that the
DCs, after consuming a great part of the earth's re-
sources, devastatingly polluting the earth, and making
themselves rich, were now asking the LDCs to remain
poor, and more gallingly, to pay for the clean up,
restoration, and conservation of the earth. Many LDCs
feared, moreover, that new environmental standards
adopted by DCs would effectively bar the entry of their
goods into DC markets.
This ideological impasse presented a formidable
challenge to international environmental diplbmacy
and the question was resolved, as best it might, by
way of a compromise. The compromise worked out in
a meeting at Founex, near Geneva, Switzerland, recog-
nized that economic development was not necessarily
incompatible with environmental protection, and that
development could proceed provided it avoided dam-
aging the environment. The essence of the understand-
ing was summed up in the Preamble to the Stockholm
Declaration. It stated that "... most of the environ-
mental problems" of LDCs were caused by underdevel-
opment and that LDCs must direct their efforts to
development, with due regard to the priority to safe-
guard and improve the environment. Similarly, the in-
dustrialized countries were exhorted to make efforts
to reduce the gap between themselves and the devel-
oping countries. In sum, the LDCs successfully thwart-
ed environmental laws and policies from damaging
their efforts to develop and grow economically,
whether by industrial progress or trade. They did not,
however, obtain substantial bankrolling, or pledges
thereof, to protect the global environment, nor did
they meaningfully advance the doctrine of "differenti-
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ated responsibility" that was later accepted at the
Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
The Stockholm Conference, under the direction of
its dynamic Secretary-General Maurice Strong, is regard-
ed as perhaps the best documented, best organized
U.N. conference of its time. It may also be considered
as the cocoon from which the chrysalis of IEL emerged
for a number of reasons. First, the biosphere or the
planet Earth was identified as an object and placed on
the agenda of national and international policy and law
in a way that had never been done before. The confer-
ence was widely attended by 114 of the then-U.N.
membership of 131. The Soviet bloc abstained from at-
tending not because it rejected the purpose or mission
of the conference but because of the status accorded
to East Germany. Second, the Stockholm Conference
resulted in the creation of the United Nations Environ-
ment Program (UNEP), the first international organiza-
tion with an exclusive environmental mandate. UNEP
has been instrumental in drafting, facilitating and nego-
tiating a number of environmental treaties. Third, the
Stockholm Conference produced a
conference declaration of twenty-six
principles (Stockholm Declaration)
that addressed the rights and obliga- The Stockhc
tions of citizens and governments
with regard to the preservation
and improvement of the environ- is rc
ment. Apart from the Stockholm
Declaration generally considered
an instrument of IEL in that it either as the besi
crystallized or generated customary
law, the conference also created an and o
action plan containing recommenda-
tions for future implementation.
A number of specific principles U.N. c
of the Stockholm Declaration bear
mention. Principles 1, 2, and 5, ad- of i,
dressing responsibilities to future
generations, are undergirded by an
obligation to conserve. Principle 1,
albeit counterbalanced by Principle
11, recognized a nascent right to a quality environ-
ment. Principle 21 referred to the right of a state to ex-
ploit its resources pursuant to their environmental (not
developmental) policies, and affirmed their obligation
not to cause transboundary injury. This was followed
by Principle 22 positing that states shall cooperate to
develop international law regarding liability and com-
pensation for extraterritorial harm.
These principles have been reinstitutionalized in
many post-Stockholm agreements. For example, Princi-
ple 21 has been incorporated in a wide range of
treaties including: the Convention on Biological Diversi-
ty, 1992; the Vienna Convention for the Protection of
the Ozone Layer, 1985; the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, 1979; the Agreement on
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,
1985; and the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 1982. Furthermore, the post-Stockholm
world has spawned a prolific number of environmental







ror almost every concern that has been the subject of
U.S. law or regulation including acid rain, hazardous
waste, ozone depletion, sea pollution from land and




Despite the uneasy truce at Founex, reflected in
the Stockholm Declaration, the persistent clash of two
cultures, environmental protection versus develop-
ment, continued to obstruct the development of IEL.
To resolve this problem the World Counission on
Environment and Development (WCED or Brundtland
Commission) was constituted by the U.N. General
Assembly in 1983 and charged with proposing long-
term environmental strategies for "sustainable develop-
ment." That elusive term was not defined by the United
Nations, and despite the efforts of the Brundtland Com-
mission and the Earth Summit, still eludes satisfactory
definition. After four years of de-
liberation, worldwide consulta-
tion, and study, the Brundtland
Conference report, Our Common Future, ar-
ticulated the paradigm on which
the Earth Summit, and indeed IEL,
rded has since been based. In essence,
it rejected the despairing thesis
)cumented that environmental problems were
past repair, spiralling out of con-
trol, and could only be averted by
?nized 'no growth" that arrested develop-
ment and economic growth. In-
ference stead, it argued that economicgrowth was both desirable and
possible within a context of sus-
ime. tainable development.
Although sustainable develop-
ment was not clearly defined, key
attributes are identifiable from the
many descriptions of it. It calls for
developmental policies in which environmental protec-
tion constitutes an integral part, and for economic
growth that can relieve the great poverty of the LDCs.
Such development and growth should be based on poli-
cies that sustain and expand the environmental re-
source base in a manner that meets the needs of the
present generation without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs. Brundtland
Commission, 8. To draw up a global plan for sustain-
able development, the Brundtland Commission report
called for an international conference that would act as
the successor to the Stockholm Conference, and carry
its legacy forward.
The U.N. General Assembly did so, and directed
the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED or Earth Summit) to take ac-
count, inter alia, of the Stockholm Declaration and
further develop IEL. An ambitious agenda was drawn
up for the Earth Summit that included (1) an Earth
Charter that would be the successor to the Stockholm
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Declaration; (2) an action plan for the planet called
Agenda 21; and (3) the ceremonial signing of two
conventions addressing with climate change and
biodiversity.
United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, 1992
The Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in June
1992 and attended by over 180 countries and 100 heads
of state, has been heralded as the greatest summit-level
conference in history. It resulted in (1) the Rio Declara-
tion on Environment and Development; (2) Agenda 21;
(3) the Nonlegally Binding Authoritative Statement of
Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management,
Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types
of Forests; and (4) the ceremonial signing of the Cli-
mate Change and Biodiversity Conventions.
Post Earth Summit assessments have, for differing
reasons, been generally favorable, while a few tend to
be almost unreservedly laudatory, even euphoric. Later
more considered evaluations are beginning to cast
doubts on these reviews, and this article does not offer
a studied and documented appraisal of that event. In-
stead, it very briefly advances some conclusions and
then illustrates the extent to which these conclusions
are borne out in the Biodiversity Convention.
In the view of this writer, the
legal results of the Earth Summit
were, at best, mottled. The Earth
Summit undoubtedly was a great
platform for environmental protec- The Ear
tion but its contribution to IEL was
more apparent than real. While it has been
did draw universal attention to en-
vironmental protection and raised
many issues onto the global agen- the greates
da, what was substantively
achieved at the Earth Summit apart conferen
from the Climate Convention was
unimpressive. To begin, the intend-
ed "Earth Charter" was replaced by
the "Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development" (Rio Dec-
laration), a title that diminished the environmental
resonance and status of that document. Second, the
principles themselves set a dubious foundation for IEL,
and effectively turned the clock back from Stockholm.
For example, the nascent right to a wholesome environ-
ment embodied in the Stockholm Declaration was aban-
doned in favor of a right to development (Principle 2).
The obligation not to cause transfrontier damage con-
tained in Principle 21 of Stockholm was weakened in
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration by the addition of cru-
cial language authorizing states "to exploit their own
natural resources pursuant to their own environmental
and developmental policies." (Emphasis added).
The obligation to conserve implied by the duty to
protect the environment for the benefit of future gen-
erations found in Stockholm is replaced in the Rio Dec-
laration by a right to consume or develop. The Rio





tal needs of present and future generations" (Principle
3). Disappointingly, this reformulation impliedly
negates or weakens the obligation to conserve ex-
pressed in Stockholm. Finally, the Rio Declaration
frowns upon action such as that taken by the United
States, under the Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972, 16 U.S.C. §5 1362-1421h, to prevent the slaugh-
ter of dolphins by prohibiting imports of tuna caught in
dolphin killing nets. Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration
states that "unilateral actions to deal with environmen-
tal challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing
country should be avoided." While the substantive
shortcomings of the Rio Declaration do not necessarily
restrict the further development of IEL, the damaging
potential of the Rio Declaration is illustrated by one of
the major treaties ceremoniously signed in Rio, and it is
to that treaty that we now turn.
Convention on Biological Diversity
A familiar, nonetheless frightening scenario, de-
picts the present as an age of mass extinction rivaling
the Cretaceous extinction 66 million years ago when
12 percent of the species resident on earth disappeared
in spasmodic catastrophe. This apocalyptic vision
emerges within the context of exponential population
growth, in which global population was 2.515 billion
in 1950, exploded to 5.291 billion
in 1990, and is estimated to rise to
6.251 by the year 2000. The figures
refer to human beings who must
ummit be fed, clothed, and housed. In
compounding this increase with
-alded as the further stress placed on forests,
wetlands, and coral reefs by an
improved standard of living and
mmit-level continued economic growth, com-
mentators have commonly arrived
at one conclusion: biodiversity is
nl hZstory, being destroyed and extinctions are
increasing inexorably.
The United Nations Convention
on Biological Diversity (Conven-
tion), ceremoniously signed at the
Earth Summit, is a much heralded chapter in interna-
tional legislation directed at arresting this trend. Al-
though envisioned as a comprehensive law that would
remedy the fragmented and regional approach to biodi-
versity protection evident in earlier treaty making, the
Convention has belied these expectations, and may halt
the advance of IEL on three fronts.
First, it rejects the concept of sustainable develop-
ment by prioritizing economic growth over environ-
mental protection, and allows international resources
earmarked for the protection of biodiversity to be ex-
pended on economic growth that could destroy biodi-
versity. Second, it denies state responsibility for
damage to the global commons. Finally, it repudiates
the idea that the plant, animal, insect and genetic re-
sources of the world (our biodiversity) are the common
heritage of humankind and that it is the responsibility
of the community of nations to protect this heritage.
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Before embarking on this brief exegesis, it is im-
portant to point out that the Convention does not be-
long to the "soft" law genus of Agenda 21 and the Rio
Declaration, or the "nonlegally binding" category of the
Forestry Principles and should be judged on its own
terms: as a species of "hard" treaty law. For the limited
purpose of this piece the main difference between
"hard" and "soft" law lies in the way norms, expecta-
tions, or consensus among the parties are expressed or
articulated. Soft laws often express themselves as politi-
cal statements, values, and exhortations as distinct from
binding rules and clear standards that are justiciable.
The very fact that such a distinction is recognized and
acted upon is ground enough for as-
serting that hard law is distinguish-
able from soft law, and nonlegally
binding documents. It is precisely
because they were aware of these The C(
distinctions that the lawmakers at
Rio created three different types of
instruments. rejects 1
If the distinction between non-
legally binding principles, hortatory of
declarations, and obligatory laws
are to mean anything, however,
hard treaty law protecting biodiver- deve
sity, as distinct from soft law or
nonlegally binding instruments,
ought to embody legally recogniz-
able duties, obligations, and rights
pertaining to the protection of biodiversity. To say this
is not to diminish or detract from other social forces
that can act more effectively and efficiently than law to
solve problems, or even avoid those problems ex ante.
Increasing knowledge and awareness about the dangers
of extinction, educational campaigns, appeals to ethics,
equity, morals, economic incentives, and market mech-
anisms could preserve biodiversity without being insti-
tutionalized as law. But there may also be felt societal
needs for establishing legal rights, duties, and obliga-
tions to complement, facilitate, empower, or harness
the use of social mechanisms and techniques.
Once it is determined by lawmakers that they want
to create hard treaty laws, it is essential that they care-
fully craft the substance, content, and form of such
rights and duties. International laws, like all laws, re-
flect the minds and intentions of their lawmakers. The
precision, extent, and force of legal prescriptions in
treaties are the product of human design, not accident.
The weight of a legal obligation, duty, or right will de-
pend on the extent to which it commands or demands
actions, and cures the perceived mischief by advancing
a remedy. In assessing the Convention, therefore, it is
useful to identify the main concerns and problems
about biodiversity that the Convention was meant to
address and then to inquire if the remedies offered by
the Convention help solve these problems.
While the factors that influence and mold the
mindset and intentions of lawmakers will continue to
be the subject of perennial inquiry, there can be little
debate that two critical questions faced the interna-





what problems did they confront? And second, how
willing were they to take legal measures-measures to
the extent possible that are binding and enforceable in
the international arena as statutes are under municipal'
law-to address these problems? While the Conven-
tion articulated the nature of the challenge caused by
vanishing biodiversity, it set its face against remedying
the problems and even turned the clock back on nu-
merous developments in international environmental
policy and law.
To begin, the Convention rejects the concept of
sustainable development-the very groundnorm of the
Earth Summit. Sustainable development has not been
authoritatively defined, but as we
have seen, it seeks at its core to
strike a balance between develop-
ment and environmental protec-
'ention tion, thus giving parity of status to
economic growth and the environ-
ment. It rejects economic develop-
concept ment and growth that is not
environmentally sensitive or de-
nable stroys the resource base, and is a
new concept precisely because it
embraces both development and
nent. environmental protection.
Despite this, the Convention
states both in its preamble and in
critical articles dealing with the fi-
nancing of the Convention that
"economic and social development and the poverty
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of de-
veloping countries." Preamble and Article 20(4). The
tenor and force of these provisions subdue, if not can-
cel, the weak clauses in the preamble "reaffirming con-
servation," and the "use of "biological resources in a
sustainable manner." Not only is biodiversity subjected
to the preeminence of development, but the interpreta-
tion of development is left to be determined subjective-
ly by developing countries. By any analysis, this
formulation elevates development and diminishes biodi-
versity and by doing so effectively disowns sustainable
development.
This diminution of biodiversity and accentuation of
development is confirmed by the financial provisions.
To enable LDCs to implement the Convention, devel-
oped countries agree both to pay the "full incremental
costs. . ." of such implementation, Article 20(2), and to
transfer technology to LDCs, Article 16. An examination
of the commitments of developing countries, in ex-
change for this transfer of money and technology, is re-
vealing. Having earlier made the point that economic
and social development and eradication of poverty are
the first and overriding priorities of developing coun-
tries, the Convention develops a logical implementing
structure. The institutional structures as well as the
"policy, strategy, programme priorities and eligibility
criteria relating to . . ." access to those transferred re-
sources and technologies will be determined by the
Conference of the Parties to the Convention. Article 21.
Where does this leave us? In the absence of an ex-
plicit commitment to protect biodiversity, any re-
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sources transferred under the Convention could be
used by a small minority of zealous developing coun-
tries to advance their own concept of economic and
social development. If, for example, they decide that
road building, "reclamation" for beach development
and marinas, or even the cutting down of tropical
forests are necessary for economic and social develop-
ment, they would be acting within the powers and
privileges granted to them.
A somewhat foreboding omen of the future direc-
tion of the Convention is offered by its treatment of
tropical rain forests. It is estimated that tropical forests
are home to at least 50 percent of plant and insect di-
versity. Yet all references to tropical forests were sys-
tematically, and deliberately excised from the
Convention. The World Conservation Union (IUCN)
drafts attempted to protect tropical and rain forests by
including the principle, carried right through to the
Fifth Revised Draft Convention, that states are responsi-
ble "for the conservation and sus-
tainable use of their biological
resources." Article 3(2)(a) of the
Fifth Revised Draft Convention on
Biological Diversity, Feb. 20, 1992, CHM
UNEP/bio.div/N7-INC.5/2. This
principle was excised from the conservati
Convention and replaced, instead,
by one that asserts the sovereign
right of states to exploit their own because it
resources subject to the duty not to
cause extraterritorial harm. Article
3. To summarize, the first flaw of maximi2
the Convention is that it under-
mines the environmental emphasis exploit
found in the concept of "sustain-
able development."
Second, the Convention tilts econon
against an emerging and developing
pattern of regional customary and
treaty laws, that has, in the last fifty
or so years, sought to establish the common responsi-
bility of humankind to protect biodiversity. They in-
clude for example: the Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972,
Preamble and Principles 1, 2, 4, 5; Convention for the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
1972, Articles 4 and 6; The Bern Convention on the
Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habi-
tats, 1979, Preamble and Articles 3, 4, 5-9 and 13; the
Apia Convention on the Conservation of Nature in the
South Pacific, 1976; the ASEAN Convention on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1985;
the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas,
1982; and the Protocol on the Conservation of Com-
mon Natural Resources, 1982. Many involved in the de-
velopment of international environmental law hoped
that the Biodiversity Convention would consolidate
these endeavors, and provide an instrument that dealt
comprehensively, globally, and more specifically with
the nature of the obligation to protect biodiversity. In-
stead, the Convention contains no substantive obliga-







Although the collective obligation to protect bio-
diversity was seen by the UNEP, the IUCN, and numer-
ous other nongovernmental organizations as constitut-
ing the foundations of the new treaty, the Convention
rejects such an obligation and instead proclaims that
states have the "sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental poli-
cies.... .. " Article 3. In similar vein, the convention re-
jects the principle that biodiversity is the natural
heritage of humankind.
The natural heritage of humankind is to be distin-
guished from the common heritage of mankind (CHM)
that has been applied to the deep-sea bed and the
ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction by
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, Arti-
cles 133, 136 and 156-169, and the outer space regime
respectively, Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and to Other Celestial Bodies, Arti-
cle 11(1). At its core the CHM involves inclusive enjoy-
ment and sharing of the products
of the common heritage, and its
thrust remains redistribution not
conservation. The essential feature
not a of CHM, whether based on res
communis or res publica, is the
st principle entitlement of the entire interna-
tional community to exploit the
sea bed and share the fruits of ex-
directed to ploitation. CHM is not a conserva-
tionist principle because it is
directed to maximizing resource;resource exploitation and economic returns.
Moreover, it is so suffused in tradi-
on and tional nonconservationist resource
economics as to render it constitu-
tionally incapable of nurturing a
returns, regime of sustainable develop-
ment.
The attempt in the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) to
secure an International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources was based on genetic resources being ac-
cepted as "a heritage of mankind." If the FAO did at-
tempt to bring plant genetic resources within that
rubric, their attempt did not improve the conservation-
ist credentials of CHM. The FAO undertaking involves
the repudiation of property rights from all
germplasm-both natural and improved-including ge-
netically engineered plants, seed, and tissue culture.
But it is clear that the thrust of the agreement is explo-
ration and utilization rather than conservation. By con-
trast, the "natural heritage of humankind" refers to the
biological necessities of the world, necessary for the
existence and development of all humankind, that may
fall within the national jurisdiction of states. Accepting
biodiversity as our common natural heritage gives rise
to the corollary obligation that we protect and preserve
such a heritage. Instead the Convention settles for an
effete and legally nonbinding recitation that biodiversi-
ty is the common "concern" of humankind. Further-
more, the attenuated affirmation that "biological
(Continued on page 76)
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regulatory sphere is a policy matter to argue with Con-
gress and not one to undo through statutory interpreta-
tion by the judiciary. The view that the perceived
problems did not justify federal intrusion lost in Con-
gress in 1977. Perhaps if revisited in Congress in 1995,
the outcome would be different. Furthermore, to the
extent that matters lie within the Administrator's dis-
cretion (as contrasted with a mandate from Congress),
another avenue for change is available. That this is a vi-
able process is illustrated by the changes the Secretary
promulgated in 1988 and upheld in National Coal As-
sociation v. Interior Department, 39 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1624 (D.D.C. 1994). Although the Secretary re-
jected a request to repeal a regulation providing for
federal notices of violation during state primacy, the
Secretary in 1988, adopting several reforms suggested
by the Mining Reclamation Council of America, made
several important changes to the process for issuing
those notices of violation. 53 Fed. Reg. 26,744 (1988),
amending 30 C.F.R. § 843.12(a)(2).
Under Chevron, Congress and the Administrator
are the preferred arenas.
International Environmental Law
(Continued from page 48)
diversity is the common concern of humankind" is
found only in the Preamble, even though it ranked as a
Fundamental Principle throughout the drafting process.
Even when the Convention attempts to protect bi-
ological diversity by in-situ conservation, ex-situ conser-
vation and sustainable use in Article 6 through Article
14, it provides that every obligation assumed (except
those related to research and training) yields to the
caveat: "as far as possible and as appropriate." Further-
more, Article 7, addressing the key elements of identifi-
cation and monitoring, allows each contracting party to
make such identification. This contrasts with earlier ex-
pectations and drafts that provided for the establish-
ment of Global Lists of Biogeographic Areas of
Particular Importance for the Conservation of Biologi-
cal Diversity and of Species Threatened with Extinction
on a Global Scale to be internationally, not nationally,
determined.
Any obligations to protect the common heritage of
humankind need not fall disproportionately on the
poor and the deprived. Given the enormous disparities
of wealth among nations, equity, fairness, and efficien-
cy require that discharging the burden of protection
should fall differentially and more heavily on the richer
nations. Biological diversity is a public good that is of
critical importance to all humanity and ought to be pro-
tected by the entire international community. In the ab-
sence of a system of international government that can
act to protect public goods for collective benefit, other
mechanisms should be found. One fecund suggestion is
to give areas of biodiversity a designated value and to
pay the owner country an interest or financial allot-
ment for the conservation or preservation of such
areas. The burden of such payments should be propor-
tionately heavier for the richer nations.
It is also clear that the duty to preserve huge ex-
tents of forest, marsh, or coral reefs rich in biological
diversity could entail daunting opportunity costs to
LDCs. For example, an obligation to protect rain forests
placed on LDCs is tantamount to denying those LDCs
the right to cut down and develop such forests, to pro-
vide land, housing, and food to their desperately poor
populace. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to devise
measures and mechanisms to ameliorate the costs
borne by LDCs.' Unfortunately, the Convention does
not confirm the responsibility of the community of na-
tions to protect biodiversity, and it even appears to re-
ject such a conclusion. This is a grievous defect, and
the second flaw of the Convention.
Third, the challenge facing the Convention was to
extend state responsibility for extraterritorial harm to
damage caused to the global commons. As we have
seen, the principle of state responsibility for extraterri-
torial harm has been accepted as international law
since at least the Stockholm Declaration of 1972. It has
subsequently been affirmed in numerous other treaties
and instruments (e.g., U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea (1982); Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development (1992); and the World Charter for Nature
(1982)). The global commons may include the critical
habitats or homes of life forms physically located with-
in the territorial jurisdiction of nation states. But such
an extension of state responsibility was roundly reject-
ed by the Convention, and its application has been
strictly confined to extraterritorial damage. The Fifth
Revised Draft Convention had asserted the principle
that states are responsible "for the conservation and
sustainable use of their biological resources." That
statement has been banished from the Principles.
What emerges is a deeply flawed Convention that
fails to live up to expectations: one that very nearly in-
terdicts the obligation to protect biodiversity, fails to
institutionalize the principle of differentiated responsi-
bility, and rejects sustainable development. The conclu-
sion that the Convention flounders in holding the ring
between the global need for biological diversity and
the sovereign right of states to control and develop
their own resources is a somber conclusion.
Rio and Beyond
The fact that the Earth Summit may have been a
step backward for IEL needs to be understood in the
context of the inherent weaknesses of IEL. First, there
is no foundational multilateral treaty that gives interna-
tional environmental protection the character, weight,
or force, for example, of free trade as established by
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Nor is there any one international organization that su-
pervises the application of international environmental
NR&E Fall 1995
law similar to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
that services and implements GATT. IEL is fragmented
and uncoordinated, and UNEP does not possess the
authority or the resources to act as the global environ-
mental counterpart of WTO. Second, IEL is a consensu-
al law that is created and implemented by the states it
regulates. Third, there is no legislative body to create
the law, no executive agency to implement it, and no
judicial body to interpret or enforce the law.
These shortcomings give rise to the need for inter-
national environmental laws that are clear and precise.
Given the competing and conflicting positions of the
187 nations of the world, it is apparent that nations
will only feel legally bound by international environ-
mental laws that create binding obligations, as distinct
from exhortational and aspirational declarations. To say
this is not to diminish, but only to distinguish from law,
nonbinding declarations, codes of
conduct, morality, ethics or reli-
gion, and other wellsprings of con-
duct. Lawmaking in the The ad
international legal system, just like
any other, is the product of the un-
derlying sociopolitical realities of must den,
ideology, politics, and self interest.
All these shortcomings do not the real d(
necessarily imply that the future is a
bleak one. It is reasonable to ad-
dress the shortcomings of the Earth in p'
Summit on a case-by-case basis be-
ginning with the Biodiversity Con- biodivers;
vention. It is still possible to
reinvent that treaty if the United
States were to play a critical role in re
and questions arise as to the nature
of the U.S. role and the strategies to
be employed. These will be sparing-
ly sketched. First, the primary aim
of any strategy must remain a World Forestry Conven-
tion. Such a convention should protect old forests, par-
ticularly tropical forests, that are home to up to 50
percent of the plant and insect biological diversity of
the world. The administration should use Senate ap-
proval as the mechanism for reaching accord on such a
Convention.
Though the Bush administration rejected any at-
tempts to bring U.S. old growth forests under the pro-
tective umbrella of a World Forestry Convention, the
Clinton administration appears ready to do so. Using
the new U.S. policy as a bargaining chip for a larger in-
ternational commitment toward preserving biodiversi-
ty may also have the additional benefit of convincing
a hostile new U.S. Congress that this is not another
"sellout" to corrupt Third World countries. The United
States should abandon its meaningless silence on the
loss of tropical forests, and conduct a strong diplomat-
ic and political campaign for a World Forestry Conven-
tion. Such a move may also be the only practical way
of securing the approval of the U.S. Senate for the
Convention. Doing so might invoke the ire of a minori-
ty of developing countries set on aggressive and mind-







environmental appeasers, who seem politically coded
toward capitulating to ecological aggression. On the
other hand, a blinkered U.S. Senate may still reject
such an initiative. Nonetheless, they must be present-
ed with a plan to save the world's tropical forests and
be seen to repudiate a serious effort to conserve the
gene banks of the planet.
Second, it is impossible to devise any strategy
without a global financial commitment to sustainable
development. A commitment to sustainable develop-
ment will embrace precisely the kind of financial and
technology transfers that the United States has es-
chewed until now. This is not an easy task for the
Clinton administration that has signed the Convention
but faces a hostile Congress. The administration must
demonstrate that the real dollars invested in protecting
biodiversity will result in real gains. To do so it must
convince a myopic U.S. Congress
that resource transfers will be di-
rected toward the-protection of
istration biodiversity, not some enterprise
within the "developmental" dis-
cretion of the recipient nation.
strate that Given the confusing state of the
financial arrangements under the
rs invested Convention, this could only be
accomplished if the United States
directs its full diplomatic efforts
cting toward transforming the proce-
dures under the Convention, draft-
vill result ing separate protocols, or byreforming the manner of its imple-
mentation.
rains. On a more general level, there
is little one can do to deal with
the constitutional weaknesses of
IEL arising from the absence of
lawmaking, law-changing, imple-
menting, and interpretive agencies. The process of
treaty implementation has to proceed consensually,
but the mechanisms and institutions from implement-
ing IEL must remain its highest priority. In this context
the restrictions imposed by GATT on environmental
trade measures must cause concern. It is time for IEL
to consider a single international environmental orga-
nization with the stature and power of the WTO. A
new World Environmental Organization is surely nec-
essary not only to countervail a trade organization that
dominates international relations but more importantly
to implement IEL. Concurrently, it is necessary to con-
sider how to move the IEL disputes that intermesh
with trade issues out of the dispute settlement proce-
dures of GATT into a neutral forum, such as the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
IEL is sufficiently mature to withstand the legal set-
backs, yet act positively to harvest the psychological
impetus and international goodwill sown by the Earth
Summit. The next ten-year review of Natural Re-
sources & Environment in 2005 may look back on the
legal setbacks at Rio as a strategic retreat that spurred
the international community, and its lawyers, to greater
efforts and results.
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